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DISCUSSION RESPONSE
The Proportionality 
Critique Still Stands
A Rejoinder to Johann Ruben Leiss
Sué González Hauck
Johann Ruben Leiss critically remarks that the perception 
underlying my original post “overburdens proportionality 
balancing with assumptions and expectations that do not 
reflect its character”. This rejoinder aims at resolving some 
apparent misunderstandings about both the object and the 
thrust of my critique. My aim is to once again highlight the 
dangers inherent in the overuse of the prevalent concept of 
proportionality balancing in the singular pursuit of 
“harmonization”.
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These dangers mainly consist in the deformalization of legal 
discourse, in intransparency, in the perpetuation of 
structural bias, and in shifts in the burden of justification. All 
of these dangers are connected to two common 
misrepresentations that can be found in a large amount of 
scholarly writings on the subject and also in Johann Ruben 
Leiss’ reply to my original post. These misrepresentations 
consist, first, in misleadingly declaring proportionality 
balancing to be a “neutral framework” and, second, in 
neglecting important differences between rights 
adjudication in domestic constitutional law and adjudication 
within specialized regimes of international law, as well as 
differences between domestic legal orders and international 
law in general. Instead of restating and defending my 
original argument in more detail, this rejoinder focuses on 
these misrepresentations.
Proportionality balancing is not a neutral framework
Questioning the neutrality of proportionality balancing as an 
argumentative framework is not equivalent to stating that 
proportionality balancing would substantively dictate the 
result of a legal decision. The latter is obviously not the case. 
However, there are two main reasons why proportionality 
balancing is not applied as a neutral framework.
First, the basic structure of proportionality balancing does 
not treat the two conflicting principles that are being 
weighed against each other equally. Given that 
proportionality balancing was originally developed in the 
context of rights adjudication, one of the principles is 
treated as being of value a priori, while the second principle 
serves only as a justification for deviations from the first 
principle. Thus, proportionality balancing as an 
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argumentative framework is biased towards the first 
principle. This is not necessarily problematic in the context 
for which proportionality balancing was developed 
originally, namely rights adjudication. In the domestic 
constitutional context, a given right can serve as the starting 
point of proportionality balancing in one case and as a 
justification for the encroachment on another right in 
another case. Thus, overall, the patterns that emerge from 
applying proportionality balancing in rights adjudication do 
not necessarily lead to an imbalance towards a specific right 
or set of rights. When proportionality balancing is employed 
as a tool for the harmonization of different sub-systems of 
international law, however, the starting point is always a rule 
belonging to the specific sub-system for which the 
respective adjudicatory body has jurisdiction. The structure 
of proportionality balancing thus favours the perpetuation of 
the structural bias inherent in the specific sub-system.
Second, proportionality balancing as harmonization tool is 
not the same as proportionality balancing as an instrument 
of rights adjudication. Proportionality balancing as it has 
been developed by domestic constitutional courts has 
evolved into an argumentative framework with a quite 
sophisticated structure. The argumentative patterns that 
have been formed enable constitutional courts to produce 
predictable and transparent decisions, even though these 
decisions are based on relatively open-structured norms. As 
harmonization tool, however, proportionality balancing 
tends to lack both of these qualities. It is not employed in the 
nuanced way in which constitutional courts apply it, but 
rather reduced to one of its three steps, either necessity or 
proportionality stricto sensu.
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Although it is not employed in an equivalently nuanced way, 
proportionality balancing as harmonization tool profits from 
the legitimacy that it has gained in constitutional rights 
adjudication. Given that proportionality balancing is an 
attractive tool for adjudicators and given that it can only be 
employed in cases where principles, not rules, are in 
conflict, it encourages international courts and tribunals to 
identify principles that supposedly can be found behind the 
rules. In an attempt to broaden the scope of proportionality 
balancing, legal scholarship has already resorted to 
reconstruct the goals of entire sub-systems of international 
law as principles. Thomas Kleinlein cites free trade, the 
protection of foreign investors and development, the 
protection of basic human rights, the humanization of armed 
conflict, self-determination, putting an end to impunity for 
the perpetrators of international crimes, and protection of 
the environment as examples for goals that have been 
reformulated as principles. If proportionality balancing is 
employed in such a manner, it achieves the opposite of what 
it achieves in constitutional rights adjudication.
The process of reformulating entire systems of rules is what 
I identified as deformalization of legal discourse. It neglects 
the function of rules as the result of a political process. Legal 
reasoning should reflect this process. It should try to 
reconstruct it and supplement it by a legal decision in the 
case at hand. This legal decision is nothing more than a 
political decision to which specific (legal) standards of 
justification apply. When entire sub-systems of rules are 
replaced by principles that are little more than rules of 
thumb, legal and political reasoning is replaced by what 
Koskenniemi calls managerialism. Expert knowledge takes 
the place of political decisions. A technical language 
describing the search for optimal results replaces a political 
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and legal language describing choices between different 
preferences.
Fragmentation and the specificities of international law
One characteristic of the international legal system is 
particularly important when it comes to assessing the 
potential of proportionality balancing as harmonization tool: 
The different specialized sub-systems of international law 
are not equipped with equally powerful judicial and quasi-
judicial organs. On the universal level, this is particularly 
true regarding international economic law on the one hand 
and international human rights law on the other hand. Thus, 
the shift in the burden of justification, which occurs when 
human rights are introduced into international economic 
law using Art. 31(3)(c) VCLT and proportionality balancing, 
has implications beyond the sub-system of international 
economic law.
It is not only the institutional imbalance, however, that 
should make international legal scholars and practitioners 
more cautious in their assessment of the potential of 
proportionality balancing as harmonization tool. A vast 
amount of literature spurred by the fragmentation debate 
tends to pursue coherence of the international legal system 
as an end in itself. Not only does this approach neglect the 
possible benefits of the diversification of international. It 
also risks aggravating the problems that are generally 
ascribed to fragmentation. The fact that international law is 
becoming increasingly differentiated and diverse holds the 
potential for reflecting plurality and enabling contestation. A 
conflict of legal norms usually reflects an underlying political 
conflict. By openly addressing normative conflicts in 
international law, one can thus address a political conflict 
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with legal means. This, however, is only the case if the 
conflict is not glossed over in an attempt at harmonization.
International legal scholars and practitioners who have 
voiced concerns about the fragmentation of international 
law have done so because they fear that it might endanger 
equality before the law, that it might lead to a lack of legal 
certainty and that it might contribute to the prevalence of 
technocracy to the detriment of legal reasoning. Any 
attempt at the harmonization of international legal norms 
should therefore aim at mitigating these problems. This aim 
cannot be achieved by simply transplanting argumentative 
frameworks from the domestic to the international context. 
Proportionality balancing works well for domestic 
constitutional courts, because they usually find themselves 
at the top of an institutional hierarchy and because their role 
as constitutional courts consists in taking into account the 
entire legal order and in holding it to the standard of the 
constitution. Constitutional courts are also embedded in a 
system of political and social institutions that, first, produce 
the minimal consensus that it necessary for them to perform 
their functions as constitutional courts and, second, have 
the ability to correct the courts’ decisions if this is deemed 
necessary. In contrast, adjudicatory bodies on the 
international level, especially those that only have 
jurisdiction over one special sub-set of international legal 
norms, lack the mandate and the social and political context 
to carry out the same functions.
Concluding Remarks
Johann Ruben Leiss‘ reply is marked by the same kind of 
thinking that I have criticised in some of the existing 
writings on proportionality balancing as a tool for the 
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harmonization of international law. It wrongly equates 
proportionality balancing as applied by constitutional courts 
in the domestic context to proportionality balancing as 
harmonization tool. It disregards the pluralistic and 
decentralized structure of the international legal order. The 
conclusion to be drawn from my critique is not that legal 
scholars and practitioners should not look beyond the 
specific sub-set of international legal norms that they are 
dealing with. Instead, normative conflicts have to be 
addressed in a transparent manner, which enables political 
contestation instead of impeding it. Proportionality 
balancing alone is not an appropriate framework for 
achieving this, especially not if it is presented at a neutral 
device that serves to achieve optimal results in an objective 
manner.
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